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Abstract—Electric vehicle (EV) is becoming more and more
popular in our daily life, which replaces the traditional fuel
vehicles to reduce carbon emissions and protect the environment.
The EVs need to be charged, but the number of charging piles
in a charging station (CS) is limited and charging is usually
more time-consuming than fueling. According to this scenario, we
propose a secure and efficient charging scheduling system based
on DAG-blockchain and double auction mechanism. In a smart
area, it attempts to assign EVs to the available CSs in the light of
their submitted charging requests and status information. First,
we design a lightweight charging scheduling framework that
integrates DAG-blockchain and modern cryptography technology
to ensure security and scalability during performing scheduling
and completing tradings. In this process, a constrained double
auction problem is formulated because of the limited charging
resources in a CS, which motivates the EVs and CSs in this
area to participate in the market based on their preferences
and statuses. Due to this constraint, our problem is more
complicated and harder to achieve the truthfulness as well as
system efficiency compared to the existing double auction model.
To adapt to it, we propose two algorithms, namely the truthful
mechanism for charging (TMC) and efficient mechanism for
charging (EMC), to determine the assignments between EVs and
CSs and pricing strategies. Then, both theoretical analysis and
numerical simulations show the correctness and effectiveness of
our proposed algorithms.
Index Terms—Electric vehicle, Charging scheduling, DAG-
blockchain, Constrained double auction, Truthfulness.
I. INTRODUCTION
TO deal with the fossil energy crisis and reduce theemission of greenhouse gas, electric vehicles (EVs) have
attracted more and more attention because of its great po-
tential. Renewable energy will become the mainstream way
of energy supply in the near future. Compared to traditional
fuel vehicles, EVs have a number of advantages such as cost
reduction, renewability, and environmental protection. With
the development of EVs, charging stations (CSs) will be
deployed in large numbers in cities, which are different from
current gas stations. Because the storage and transportation
of gasoline are cumbersome, the deployment of gas stations
is usually more centralized. Electricity does not have this
problem, especially after the rise of distributed energy. Thus,
the deployment of CSs is more distributed, the number of CSs
is larger, and individual CSs are smaller. Besides, it usually
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takes more than half an hour for charging an EV, which is
different from fueling that can be done instantaneously. This
has also created a degree of administrative hardship.
In this paper, we consider such a scenario: In a smart area,
there is a manager that is responsible for the overall scheduling
of EVs and CSs in this area. The EVs hope to complete
charging at the fastest speed and the least expense, but the CSs
want to maximize the profits by providing charging services.
However, there are some challenges needed to be solved.
On the one hand, it lacks an effective approach to ensure the
security of charging trading between EVs and CSs. Traditional
centralized trading platforms depend on a trusted third party
to manage and store every transaction between EVs and CSs
[1], which are troubled by same attacks, such as single point
of failure, denial of service, and privacy leakage [2]. A lot
of existing researches about charging management neglects
the security and privacy protection of trading. The advent of
blockchain technology makes it possible to improve these is-
sues. Blockchain achieves the purpose of security and privacy
protection by taking advantage of the knowledge of modern
cryptography and distributed consensus protocol. Based on
that, we propose a blockchain-based charging scheduling
(BCS) system to manage the charging assignments between
EVs and CSs in a secure and efficient manner. First, we
are able to protect the contents of communication among
the entities in this system from being tampered or leaked by
using digital encryption techniques. In addition, the classic
consensus mechanisms used in blockchains, such as proof-of-
work (PoW) and proof-of-stake (PoS), has high computational
cost and low confirmation speed [3] [4]. The synchronous
consensus mechanism cannot make full use of network band-
width. To improve the throughput, the infrastructure of our
BCS system is built on a directed acyclic graph (DAG)-
based blockchain [5] that has an asynchronous consensus
mechanism. Here, the EVs work as light nodes, while the
CSs work as full nodes that are responsible for issuing new
transactions, storing, and maintaining the entire blockchain.
On the other hand, we have mentioned that charging is
time-consuming than fueling. For each CS in this system,
it has a limited number of charging piles. We can imagine
that an EV goes to a CS for charging, but there is no idle
charging pile at this moment that can charge it. This EV has
to wait for other EVs to finish charging or goes to other
CSs, which is frustrating. For each EV in this system, it
has a stronger preference for those CSs that locate near it
or provide better services. Because the EVs and CSs in this
system belong to different entities, they are driven by their
own utility. Then, a natural question is how to assign the EV
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that submit charging request in this system to a CS with a
limited number of charging piles. Based on that, we formulate
a constrained double auction model, where EVs are buyers
and CSs are sellers. It can be considered as an instance of a
single-round multi-item double auction process [6]. To address
it, Jin et al. [7] [8] proposed a resource allocation problem
in mobile cloud computing and designed a truthful resource
auction mechanism for the resource trading between mobile
users (buyers) and cloudlet (sellers). However, it is a one-
to-one mapping from buyers to sellers, namely at most one
mobile user can be assigned to a cloudlet at a moment. This
scheme cannot be applied to solve our problem because the
number of EVs that can be assigned to a CS is more than one
but less than the number of charging piles in this CS. In other
words, this is a many-to-one mapping from buyers to sellers.
Secondly, consider to maximize the utilities of CSs (sellers),
the assignment and price determination depends not only on
the unit bids of EVs, but also on their charging amounts. Due
to the constraints of the limited number of charging piles in
CSs as well as different preferences and charging amount of
EVs, our constrained double auction model is distinguished
with any existing double auctions. It is more complex and
harder to achieve the truthfulness and system efficiency. To
solve this challenge, we design a truthful mechanism for
charging (TMC) first to determine the winners and clearing
prices. By theoretical analysis, it satisfies individual rationality,
budget balance, truthfulness, and computational efficiency. In
order to achieve truthfulness, TMC sacrifices part of system
efficiency. To improve the system efficiency, we design an
efficient mechanism for charging (EMC) then that increases
the number of successful trades (winning buyers) significantly
than that in TMC. Nevertheless, EMC is not able to ensure
truthfulness for the buyers in extreme cases.
Finally, we evaluate our proposed mechanisms, TMC and
EMC, by numerical simulations. By simulating a charging
scenario, we can see that TMC satisfies the aforementioned
four properties of the double auction and the system efficiency
can be improved significantly by EMC. To our best knowledge,
this is the first time to put forward a charging scheduling sys-
tem by integrating DAG-blockchain and give detailed solutions
to the constrained double auction model, which can be used
as a supplement to the theory of double auction.
Orginizations: In Sec. II, we discuss the-state-of-art work.
In Sec. III, we introduce the background of DAG-blockchain.
In Sec. IV, we present our BCS system and charging schedul-
ing framework elaborately. In Sec. V, constrained double
auction is formulated. Then, two solving mechanism TMC
and EMC are shwon in Sec.VI and VII. Finallym we evaluate
our proposed algorithms by numerical simulations in Sec.VIII
and show the conclusions in Sec. IX.
II. RELATED WORK
Recently, blockchain has been used as an effective method
to deal with the issues of transactions generated by peer-
to-peer (P2P) energy trading among EVs. Kang et al. [9]
exploited a P2P electricity trading system with consortium
blockchain to motivate EVs to discharge for balancing local
electricity demand. Liu et al. [10] proposed an EV partic-
ipation charging scheme for a blockchain-enable system to
minimize the fluctuation level of the grid network and charging
cost of EVs. Su et al. [11] designed a contract-based energy
blockchain in order to make EVs charge securely in the
smart community, while they implemented a reputation-based
delegated Byzantine fault tolerance consensus algorithm. Zhou
et al. [12] developed a secure and efficient energy trading
mechanism based on consortium blockchain for vehicle-to-
grid that exploited the bidirectional transfer technology of
EVs to reduce the demand-supply mismatch. Xia et al. [13]
proposed a vehicle-to-vehicle electricity scheme in blockchain-
enabled Internet of vehicle to address the driving endurance
issue of EV. However, due to the lack of computational power,
blockchain cannot be deployed in the systems associated with
EVs now. DAG-based blockchain (Tangle) [5] emerged as a
new type of blockchain, which reduces the reliance on com-
putational power and improves the throughput significantly.
Huang et al. [14] presented a DAG-based blockchain wit a
credit-based consensus mechanism for power-constrained IoT
devices. Hassija et al. [15] exploited DAG-based blockchain to
support the increasing number of transactions in the vehicle-to-
grid network. In this paper, our BCS system is built on DAG-
based blockchain as well because of its limited computational
power and high-frequency trading.
Auction theory has been widely applied in many different
fields, such as mobile crowdsensing [16] [17], mobile cloud
computing [7] [8], and energy trading [18] [19]. Here, we only
focus on double auction, where buyers (resp. sellers) submit
their bids (resp. asks) to an auctioneer. There are two classic
models: McAfee double auction [20] and Vickrey-based model
[21]. They only consider homogeneous items and Vickrey-
based model cannot satisfy the truthfulness unfortunately. To
heterogeneous items, Yang et al. [6] designed a truthful double
auction scheme for the cooperative communications, where
the auctioneer first use an assignment algorithm according to
design objective to get candidates and mapping from buyer
to seller, then apply McAfee double auction to determine the
winners and corresponding clearing prices. Based on [6], Jin
et al. [7] [8] proposed a truthful resource auction mechanism
in mobile cloud computing, which is the most relevant to this
paper. However, there are obvious differences in our work. As
mentioned in Sec. I, in our constrained double auction model,
the number of buyers that can be assigned to the same seller
is constrained. Furthermore, we consider not only the bids of
buyers, but also their charging amounts. It is more difficult to
achieve the truthfulness and system efficiency, which is our
main contribution in this paper.
III. BACKGROUND FOR DAG-BLOCKCHAINS
Blockchain is an emerging technology that acts as a de-
centralized ledger or database since Nakamoto published his
original prototype in 2008 [22], which is implemented by
modern cryptographic technologies and distributed consensus
algorithms. Because of these technical characteristics, tamper-
ing with transactions in the blockchain requires more than
half of the computational power, which prevents attacks from
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(a) The chain-based blockchain
(b) The DAG-based blockchain
Fig. 1. The comparison of chain-based and DAG-based blockchian, where
the square nodes in (a) are blocks and the circle nodes in (b) are transactions.
malicious nodes effectively. All transactions are digitally en-
crypted during communication and storage, which realizes the
anonymity and privacy protection of the blockchain system.
They can enable users who do not trust each other to trade
freely in a secure and reliable environment without a third
platform. Then, a number of real applications boomed, such
as Bitcoin [22], Ethereum [23], and Hyperledger fabric [24],
which are all based on the chain-based blockchain.
The chain-based blockchain is shown in Fig. 1(a), where
a block contains a certain number of transactions. All users
maintain the longest main chain jointly, and only the trans-
actions in the main chain can be considered legal. However,
the chain-based blockchain is limited by its high requirement
for computational power because of its consensus mechanism
based on hashing puzzles, thereby it cannot be applied to
devices with limited power. Secondly, it generates and verifies
the blocks in a sequential and synchronous manner, resulting
in low throughput. Take Bitcoin as an instance, its average
throughput is about 7 TPS (Trans. Per Second) [25]. Thus, it
is not suitable for those real-time application scenarios. Here,
the system we design is based on EVs which are both resource-
limited and high-throughput, hence the chain-based structure
is difficult to achieve our goal.
To improve the scalability, a new blockchain architecture
based on the directed acyclic graph (DAG) was proposed,
called DAG-based blockchain or tangle [5]. The DAG-based
blockchain is shown in Fig. 1(b), where each node represents
a transaction instead of a block. When a new transaction is
issued, it must validate two tips which are previous trans-
actions attached in the tange but not verified by any others.
This validation is denoted by a directed edge in the tangle.
Generally, there is a weight associated with each transaction,
which is proportional to the difficulty of the hashing puzzle
defined by itself. When issues a new transaction, it has to find
a random number nouce such that
Hash(Transaction, Timestamp, nouce) ≤ Target (1)
where the smaller the target implies the greater the weight.
Until now, the newly issued transaction is completed and
waits to be verified by subsequent transactions. When can we
consider a transaction is valid? This is related to its cumulative
weight. The cumulative weight of a transaction is the weight
sum of transactions that approve it directly or indirectly.
Shown as Fig.1(b), the cumulative weight of transaction A
equals the weight sum of transactions A, B, C, D, E, F, and
G. Consider a transaction, the larger cumulative weight can
only be achieved by consuming more computational power,
thereby it is more likely to be legal if it has a larger cumulative
weight. A transaction is believed to be legal if and only if its
cumulative weight exceeds a pre-defined threshold. Suppose
that most power is controlled by legal users, we can distinguish
those transactions issued by malicious users since the valid
transactions will be verified by other legal users and their
cumulative weight will be larger and larger.
Different from those synchronous consensus mechanisms in
the chain-based blockchain, the validation process in the DAG-
based blockchain is completed in an asynchronous approach.
Besides, it is able to defend possible attacks effectively, such
as a single point of failure, Sybil attack, lazy tips, and double-
spending. According to that, the DAG-based blockchain can
not only provide us with a secure and reliable trading environ-
ment but also improve throughput and reduce the requirements
for the computational power of devices. Then, a lot of real
systems based on DAG-based blockchain emerged, such as
IOTA [5], Byteball [26], and Nano [27]. Finally, the devices in
our charging scheduling system are resource-limited and trade
with others frequently, thereby the DAG-based blockchain is
an ideal choice to act as infrastructure to achieve security and
privacy protection.
IV. BLOCKCHAIN-BASED CHARGING SCHEDULING
SYSTEM
In this section, we demonstrate the overview of our
blockchain-based charging scheduling (BCS) system by in-
troducing entities and charging scheduling framework.
A. Entities for BCS System
Consider a smart area, there are a certain number of CSs
with charging piles available to charge the EVs in this area.
Then, it exists a manager that is responsible for managing
entities and executing the charging scheduing between EVs
and CSs. Thereby, there are three main entities in this system
shown as follows:
• Electric vehicle (EV): The EVs running in this area play
the part of requesters. When it is low on power, the EV
will request for charging services to the manager.
• Charging station (CS): The CSs located in this area play
the part of providers to charge the EVs. A CS has many
charging piles, where each charging pile can charge one
EV at a time. When it is idle, the CS will inform the
manager with its status information.
• Manager: The manager works as an energy scheduler.
Each EV sends a request about its charging preference
and each CS submits its status information on how many
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Fig. 2. The architecture of blockchain-based charging scheduling system in
a smart area.
Fig. 3. The procedure and message flow of charging scheduling between CSs
and EVs in a smart area.
charging piles are available to the manager. Then, the
manager acts as an auctioneer to perform a constrained
double auction mechanism between EVs and CSs that
assigns EVs to CSs and determines the clearing prices.
The price charged to EV and payment rewarded to CS
are determined by the clearing prices.
Based on that, the BCS system can be denoted by B =
{M,V,C} where V = {V1, V2, · · · } is the set of EVs, C =
{C1, C2, · · · } is the set of CSs, and M is manager. Then,
we define a transaction Tij between Vi ∈ V and Cj ∈ C as
the charging trading and digital payment record between them
that is stored in the blockchain. It includes their pseudonyms,
data type, transaction details, and timestamps of generation. In
order to ensure security and privacy protection, the transaction
is encrypted by their digital signatures and the payment is
made in the form of charging coins.
B. Architecture for BCS system
The infrastructure of BCS system B = {M,V,C} is estab-
lished on DAG-based blockchain, where each aforementioned
entity is a node in this system. Depending on their abilities
towards computation and storage, they can be split into two
categories: light node and full node. For the light nodes, they
have limited computational power and memory space, thereby
they only be responsible for generating transactions with full
nodes together. Only part of the information about themselves
are stored that are convenient for them to check. For the full
nodes, they usually possess powerful servers with multiple
functions, which can issue new transactions by finding a
valid nonce and validate the previous tips. Moreover, they are
responsible for storing and maintaining the entire blockchain,
namely the tangle.
The architecture of our BCS system is shown in Fig. 2. In
our BCS system B, each EV Vi ∈ V works as a light node,
and each CS Cj ∈ C works as a full node. The manager
M is a specific full node that manages the entire system to
make sure it works instead of storing and maintain the tangle.
For the full nodes, the difficulty of the hashing puzzle can
be set by modifying different target values dynamically to fit
their computational power. For the manager, in addition to the
above-mentioned function that carries out constrained double
auction between EVs and CSs as an auctioneer, it has the right
to add or delete nodes according to the actual situation. For
example, it can permit new CSs to join this system and remove
some malicious EVs from this system. Besides, it can block
those invalid requests from the nodes within the system and
prevent attacks from the nodes outside the system in advance.
Also, the architecture of our BCS system is based on DAG-
based blockchain, which is not only distributed and reliable to
defend against attacks but also improves the throughput to be
qualified for high-frequency energy trading.
In our BCS system, we use asymmetric cryptography such
as the elliptic curve digital signature algorithm [28] for system
initialization. Each EV Vi ∈ V registers on a trusted authority
to be a legitimate node through obtaining a unique identi-
fication IDi that is associated with its license plate and a
certificate Ceri that is signed by the private key of authority to
certify the authenticity of this identity. After verifying its cer-
tificate, the EV Vi can join this system and be assigned with a
public/private key pair (PKi, SKi) where its public key works
as a pseudonym that is open to all nodes and its private key
that is kept by itself. In asymmetric encryption, the message
encrypted by the public key can be decrypted by corresponding
private key, and vice versa. After joining this system, there is a
set of wallet address {Wi(k)}θk=1 owned by the EV Vi. Thus,
the account of each EV Vi ∈ V that joins this system can
be denoted by AEi = {IDi, Ceri, (PKi, SKi), {Wi(k)}θk=1}.
Similarly, the account of each CS Cj ∈ C can be denoted by
CEj = {IDj , Cerj , (PKj , SKj), {Wj(k)}θk=1}.
C. Charging Scheduling Framework
The detailed procedure and message flow of charging
scheduling between EVs and CSs are shown in Fig. 3. We
assume it performs in discrete times. Consider at time step t,
the specific operations can be divided into 7 steps:
1) Request and Status: Each EV Vi ∈ V sends a request
message Ri that includes its bid for charging at each CS
Cj ∈ C to the manager. This request message is denoted
by ReqMsg = {PKM (Ri), Ceri, ST ime} where PKM is
the public key of manager and STime is the timestamp
of this message generation. At the same time, each CS
Cj ∈ C sends a status message Sj that includes its ask
for serving a vehicle and the number of available charging
piles to the manager. This status message is denoted by
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StaMsg = {PKM (Sj), Cerj , ST ime}. Here, the request
and status message are encrypted by the manager’s public key
PKM since they only allowed to be read by the manager for
privacy protection and fair trading.
2) Scheduling: The manager waits to receive request mes-
sages from the EVs and status messages from the CSs. After
collecting them, the manager confirms their legitimate identity
by verifying their certificate. Then, it works as a scheduler
to assign each winning EV to a CS that has unoccupied
charging piles. Besides, it determines the price charged to EV
and payment rewarded to CS as well, which is executed by
the built-in smart contract and implemented by a constrained
double auction mechanism explained in Sec.V and VI.
3) Order and Assignment: The manager sends an order
message Oi to each winning EV Vi ∈ V and an assignment
message Aj to each winning CS Cj ∈ C. The Oi includes a
CS that can serve to it and the price charged to it, which is
denoted by OrdMsg = {PKi(Oi), CerM , ST ime}. The Aj
includes an assignment, the set of EVs that can be charged
in Cj , and the payment rewarded to it, which is denoted by
AssMsg = {PKj(Aj), CerM , ST ime}. Here, the order and
assignment message are encrypted by their public key PKi
and PKj because of permitting to be read by themselves.
4) Confirm: If EV Vi receives an order message from the
manager, it implied it can be charged at the CS Cx designated
by the manager. Then, the EV Vi sends a confirm message
Fi like “I will come on time” to the designated CS Cx. It is
denoted by ConMsg = {PKx(Fi), Ceri, ST ime} encrypted
by Cx’s public key PKx for similar reasons.
5) Charging: Once CS Cx receives the confirm message
from the EV Vi, it will check whether the Vi is in its
assignment Ax. If yes, the CS Cx can provide charging service
to EV Vi before the deadline. After charging, the EV Vi
generates a new transaction Tix according to their trading
information, signs and sends the SKi(Tix) back to Cx.
6) Transactions: When CS Cx receives the new transaction
from the EV Vi, it will check and sign this transaction by its
private key as well. Now, the CS Cx issues this new transaction
SKx(SKi(TXix)) in the DAG-based blockchain. It is able to
adjust the difficulty of the hashing puzzle by setting different
targets dynamically according to its computational power and
transaction frequency.
7) Verification and payment: After the transaction Tix is
issued, it will be verified to be legal in the future when its
cumulative weight is large enough. At this moment, charging
coins should be transferred from the wallet of Vi to Cx. The
coins with the price charged to Vi will be deducted from the
wallet Wi(k) and coins with the payment rewarded to Cx will
be added into the wallet Wx(k) permanently.
V. PROBLEM FORMULATION
In our BCS system B = {M,V,C}, The CSs in C provide
charging piles for EVs in V that need charging. Each CS
Ci ∈ C has limited charging piles, where the number of
charging piles in this charging station is ki ∈ Z+. In general,
the CSs are distributed evenly across this smart area, also
those located in the area center are usually more crowded. Fur-
thermore, the CSs have different charging efficiencies, where
higher efficiency means shorter charging time. Thus, there are
two critical attributes, location and efficiency, associated with
each CS, which determines the valuation of a EV toward it.
The valuation of an EV toward a CS can be decided according
to its requirement. For example, when the battery of an EV
is very low, it values high a CS that is nearest to it. But for
an EV in a hurry, it considers both location and efficiency to
minimize its charging time. In the trading between EVs and
CSs, we aim to incentivize the CSs to provide charging service
and meet the demands of the EVs. To benefit both EVs and
CSs, we design a constrained double auction mechanism that
gets a truthful assignment between EVs and CSs.
A. Constrained Double Auction Model
Shown as Fig. 3, we assume that this system runs in discrete
times. At each time step, the EVs send request messages and
the CSs send status messages privately to the managers. Based
on the single-round multi-item double auction model [6], the
EVs are buyers and the CSs are sellers in this auction. The
manager M ∈ B works as the trusted third auctioneer to assign
n buyers to m sellers and determine the price charged to each
buyer and payment rewarded to each seller.
The set of buyers is V = {V1, V2, · · · , Vn} and the set of
sellers is C = {C1, C2, · · · , Cm}. For each buyer Vi ∈ V,
its bid vector is denoted by Bi = (b1i , b
2
i , · · · , bmi ) where bji
is the unit bid (maximum buying price per unit charging) of
Vi for charging at seller Cj ∈ C. Additionally, we define a
charging vector R = (r1, r2, · · · , rn) where ri is the charging
amount of Vi. For the sellers in C, the ask vector is denoted
by A = (a1, a2, · · · , am) where aj ∈ A is the unit ask
(minimum selling price per unit charging) of Cj . As for the
number of available charging piles in each CS, we define a
vector K = (k1, k2, · · · , km) where kj ∈ Z+ is the number
of piles that can charging EVs in Cj ∈ C. Here, we notice
that the bids of a buyer vary with sellers since each EV has
different evaluations on CSs according to its requirements
about location and efficiency. However, the ask of a seller
remains unchanged among buyers because it is only concerned
about payment from charging vehicles.
By aforementioned definitions, the requset message sent by
buyer Vi is denoted by Ri = (Bi, ri) and the status message
sent by seller Cj is denoted by Sj = (aj , kj). After it gets
the collection (B,R,A,K) where B = (B1;B2; · · · ;Bn),
the auctioneer determines the winning buyer set Vw ⊆ V, the
winning seller set Cw ⊆ C, a mapping from Vw to Cw that is
σ : {i : Vi ∈ Vw} → {j : Cj ∈ Cw}, the unit price pˆi charged
to buyer Vi ∈ Vw, and the unit payment p¯j rewarded to seller
Cj . The assignment Aj for each Cj ∈ Cw is
Aj = {Vi ∈ Vw : σ(i) = j} where |Aj | ≤ kj (2)
because the CS Cj permits at most kj EVs to be charged at
the same time, which is the reason why this model is called
“constrained” double auction. Moreover, for each buyer Vi ∈
V, its valuation vector is denoted by V i = (v1i , v2i , · · · , vmi )
where vji is its unit valuation of Vi for charging at seller Cj ∈
C. For the sellers in C, the cost vector is denoted by C =
(c1, c2, · · · , cm) where cj ∈ C is the unit cost of Cj to provide
JOURNAL OF LATEX CLASS FILES, VOL. 14, NO. 8, AUGUST 2015 6
charging service. Based on buyer’s valuation and seller’s cost,
the utility uˆi of winning buyer Vi ∈ Vw and the utility u¯j of
winning seller Cj ∈ Cw can be defined as follows:
uˆi = (v
σ(i)
i − pˆi) · ri (3)
u¯j = (p¯j − cj) ·
∑
Vi∈Aj
ri (4)
Otherwise, for losing buyer Vi /∈ Vw and losing seller Cj /∈
Vw, their utilities are uˆi = 0 and u¯j = 0. Here, the utility uˆi
is proportional to the difference of its valuation and charged
price, which implies the satisfaction level of Vi on its assigned
CS. The utility u¯j is proportional to the difference of rewarded
payment and its cost, which characterizes the profitability of
Cj for providing charging service.
B. Design Rationales
The constrained double auction model defined in last sub-
section can be denoted by Ψ = (V,C,B,R,A,K). A valid
double auction mechanism has to meet the following three
properties first, they are
• Individual Rationality: The price charged to winning
buyer is not more than its bid and the payment rewarded
to winning seller is not less than its ask. Consider our
model Ψ, we have pˆi ≤ bσ(i)i for each Vi ∈ Vw and
p¯j ≥ aj for each Cj ∈ Cw.
• Budget Balance: The total price charged to all winning
buyers is not less than the total payment rewarded to
all winning sellers, which ensures the profitability of the
auctioneer. Thus,∑
Vi∈Vw
pˆi · ri −
∑
Cj∈Cw
p¯j ·
∑
Vi∈Aj
ri ≥ 0 (5)
Besides, in our model Ψ, we need to guarantee that the
assignment for each winning seller is not more than its
number of charging piles, that is |Aj | ≤ kj for Cj ∈ Cw.
• Computational Efficiency: The auction results, includ-
ing winning buyers, winning sellers, mapping from win-
ning, price charged to buyer, and payment rewarded to
seller, can be obtained in polynomial time.
In addition to the above three properties, there are two
more important properties that should be satisfied strictly or
approximately.
• Truthfulness: A double auction is truthful if every buyer
(resp. seller) bids (resp. asks) truthfully is one of its
dominant strategy that maximizes its utility. That is to
say, no buyer can increase its utility by giving a bid
that is different from its true valuation and no seller can
increase its utility by giving an ask that is different from
its true cost. Consider our model Ψ, we have uˆi can be
maximized by bidding Bi = V i for each Vi ∈ V and u¯j
can be maximized by asking aj = cj for each Cj ∈ C
when other players do not change their strategies.
• System Efficiency: There are a number of different
metrics to evaluate the system efficiency of a double
auction model. The most common approach [21] is the
number of completed trades, that is the number of buyers
in the winning buyer set Vw in our model Ψ. Here, each
buyer Vi ∈ Vw will be assigned to a seller Cj ∈ Cw,
which satisfies the requirements of both buyer and seller.
To maximize it, this is in line with our original intention
of designing this system to make as many EVs as possible
to be charged. Other metrics, such as total price charged
to winning buyers, total payment rewarded to winning
seller, and profit of auctioneer, should be considered as
well based on needs. We will analyze them in later.
To the truthfulness, we assume the submitted vector R and
K are trusted and cannot be tampered because they can be
monitored by reliable hardware. Thereby, we only consider
the bids B and asks A to analyze the truthfulness of model
Ψ. When it is truthful, the double auction model avoids being
manipulated maliciously due to the fact that each player can
get the best utility by telling the truth. There is no player that
has the motivation to lie since they do not have to adapt to
others’ strategies by telling the lie for improving their utilities.
Therefore, the truthfulness simplifies the strategic decisions for
players and makes sure a fair market environment, which plays
an important role in mechanism design.
VI. TRUTHFUL MECHANISM FOR CHARGING
In this section, we design a truthful mechanism for charging
(TMC) based on our constrained double auction model and
analyze whether it satisfies the desired properties in Sec. V-B.
A. Algorithm Design
The process of TMC is shown in Algorithm 1, where it is
composed of two sub-processes, winning candidate determi-
nation (TMC-WCD) shown in Algorithm 2 and assignment &
pricing (TMC-AP) shown in Algorithm 3. In TMC, we select
the winning candidates, then assign winning buyer candidates
to winning seller candidates truthfully. At the same time, the
price charged to winning buyer and payment rewarded to
winning seller can be determined.
Shown as Algorithm 2, in the process of winning candidate
determination, we sort the buyers in descending order based
on their bids for different sellers, where each buyer Vs ∈ V
is replaced with a buyer set {Vst : bts > 0, Ct ∈ C} in which
buyer Vs gives a positive bid to seller Ct. The sellers are sorted
in ascending order based on their ask. The median of asks from
sellers ajφ is selected as a threshold [7] to control the number
of buyer and seller candidates. Let ϕ satisfy btϕsϕ ≥ ajφ and
b
tϕ+1
sϕ+1 < ajφ , buyer Vst will be a winning buyer candidate if
its bid bts is not less than b
tϕ
sϕ and the ask of requested seller
at is less than the threshold ajφ . Seller Ct will be a winning
seller candidate if its ask at is less than ajφ and there exists
at least one winning buyer candidate biding for it.
Shown as Algorithm 3, in the process of assignment &
pricing, we sort the Vc in descending order based on their
total bids, which is the unit bids multiply by their charging
amounts. The total bid of buyer Vst is bts · rs definitely. For
each winning buyer candidate Vst ∈ Vc, it has met the basic
conditions for closing a deal because there is a winning seller
candidate Ct ∈ Cc with bts > at and at < ajφ . For each
seller Ct ∈ Cc, we assign the buyers with larger total bids to
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Algorithm 1 TMC (V,C,B,R,A,K)
Input: V,C,B,R,A,K
Output: Vw,Cw, σ, Pˆw, P¯w
1: (Vc,Cc, ajψ )← TMC-WCD (V,C,B,A)
2: (Vw,Cw, σ, Pˆw, P¯w)← TMC-AP (Vc,Cc, ajψ ,R,K)
3: return (Vw,Cw, σ, Pˆw, P¯w)
Algorithm 2 TMC-WCD (V,C,B,A)
Input: V,C,B,A
Output: Vc,Cc, ajφ
1: Vc ← ∅,Cc ← ∅
2: Construct a set V′ = {Vst : bts > 0, Vs ∈ V} based on B
3: Sort the buyers in V′ and transfer it to an order list V′ =
〈Vs1t1 , Vs2t2 , · · · , Vsxtx〉 such that bt1s1 ≥ bt2s2 ≥ · · · ≥ btxsx
4: Sort the sellers, get an order list C′ = 〈Cj1 , Cj2 , · · · , Cjm〉
such that aj1 ≤ aj2 ≤ · · · ≤ ajm
5: Find the median ask ajφ of C′, φ =
⌈
m+1
2
⌉
6: Find the minimum ϕ from V′ such that btϕ+1sϕ+1 < ajφ
7: V′′ ← 〈Vs1t1 , Vs2t2 , · · · , Vsϕtϕ〉
8: for each Vst ∈ V′′ do
9: if at < ajφ then
10: Vc ← Vc ∪ {Vst}
11: if Ct /∈ Cc then
12: Cc ← Cc ∪ {Ct}
13: end if
14: end if
15: end for
16: return (Vc,Cc, ajφ)
it in priority. Thereby, there is a “tentative set” Ht associated
with each Ct ∈ Cc, which contains at most kt buyers with
maximum total bids to Ct in Qc. It can be implemented in
line 5-18. We denoted by pˆst the unit price charged to buyer
Vs that gets service from Ct. Similar, the utility uˆst for each
buyer Vs ∈ Ht can be defined as uˆst = (vts − pˆst) · rs;
Otherwise, the utility is uˆst = 0 for the buyer Cs /∈ Ht.
For example, let 〈Vo1t, · · · , Vozt〉 ⊆ Qc be all buyers in
Qc that bid for Ct with bto1 · ro1 ≥ · · · ≥ btoz · roz . If
kt ≥ z, we have Ht = 〈Vo1t, · · · , Vozt〉 and pˆoit = ajφ for
each Voit ∈ Ht; Else, we have Ht = 〈Vo1t, · · · , Vokt t〉 and
pˆoit = max{ajφ , btokt+1 · (rokt+1/roi)} for each Voit ∈ Ht to
guarantee truthfulness. Then, for each winning buyer Vs ∈ Vw,
it can be assigned to one of the seller in Is. The Vs selects
the optimal seller Ctm ∈ Is such that uˆstm ≥ uˆst for each
Ct ∈ Is. Now, the mapping is σ(s) = tm and the charged
price is pˆs = pˆstm . Finally, the payment rewarded to winning
seller in Cw is given by ajφ unanimously.
B. Properties of TMC
Next, we argue that our proposed TMC mechanism satisfies
the four desired propoerties.
Lemma 1. The TMC is individually rational.
Proof. For each winning buyer Vs ∈ Vw and winning seller
Ct ∈ Cw, we need to show that the charged price pˆs ≤ bσ(s)s
Algorithm 3 TMC-AP (Vc,Cc, ajφ ,R,K)
Input: Vc,Cc, ajφ ,R,K
Output: Vw,Cw, σ, Pˆw, P¯w
1: Vw ← ∅,Cw ← ∅, Pˆw ← ∅, P¯w ← ∅
2: Sort the buyers in Vc, get an ordered queue Qc =
〈Vs1t1 , Vs2t2 , · · · , Vsyty 〉 such that bt1s1 · rs1 ≥ bt2s2 · rs2 ≥
· · · ≥ btysy · rsy
3: Create a tentative set Hj ← ∅ from each Cj ∈ Cc
4: K ′ = (k′1, k
′
2, · · · , k′m) copied from vector K
5: while Qc 6= ∅ do
6: Vsltl ← Qc.pop(0) // Obtain the first element in the
queue Qc, then remove it from Qc.
7: if k′tl > 0 then
8: Htl ← Htl ∪ {Vsl}, k′tl ← k′tl − 1
9: pˆsltl ← ajφ
10: else
11: for each Vs ∈ Htl do
12: pˆstl ← max{ajφ , btlsl · (rsl/rs)}
13: end for
14: for each Vstl ∈ Qc do
15: Qc ← Qc\{Vstl}
16: end for
17: end if
18: end while
19: Vw ← {Vs : ∃j(Cj ∈ Cc ∧ Vs ∈ Hj)}
20: for each Vs ∈ Vw do
21: Is ← {Ct : Vs ∈ Ht, Ct ∈ Cc}
22: Find Ctm ∈ arg maxCt∈Is{uˆst = (vts − pˆst) · rs}
23: σ(s) = tm
24: pˆs ← pˆstm , Pˆw ← Pˆw ∪ {pˆs}
25: if Ctm /∈ Cw then
26: Cw ← Cw ∪ {Ctm}
27: end if
28: end for
29: for each Ct ∈ Cw do
30: p¯t ← ajφ , P¯w ← P¯w ∪ {p¯t} // Payments
31: end for
32: return (Vw,Cw, σ, Pˆw, P¯w)
and the rewarded payment p¯t ≥ at. According to Algorithm 2,
it must be at < ajφ if Ct ∈ Cw ⊆ Cc. Thereby the payment
rewarded to winning seller p¯t = ajφ is larger than its ask at
for each Ct ∈ Cw. Consider a winning buyer Vs ∈ Vw, the
charged price is either pˆs = ajφ or pˆs = b
σ(s)
sl · (rsl/rs).
• In the first case, it must be bσ(s)s ≥ bqϕpϕ if Vs ∈ Vw. The
price charged to winning buyer pˆs = ajφ is not more than
its bid bσ(s)s definitely.
• In the second case, we have bσ(s)s ·rs ≥ btlsl ·rsl according
to Algorithm 3. The price charged to winning buyer pˆs =
b
σ(s)
sl · (rsl/rs) is not more than its bid bσ(s)s .
Thus, the TMC is individually rational because all winning
buyers and sellers are individually rational.
Lemma 2. The TMC is budget balanced.
Proof. Shown as Algorithm 3, each winninng buyer Vs ∈ Vw
is assigned to exact one winning seller Ct ∈ Cw, hence this is
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a many-to-one mapping from Vw to Cw and Vw = ∪Cj∈CwAj .
For each mapping σ(s) = t from winning buyer Vs to winning
seller Ct, we have pˆs ≥ ajφ = p¯t. Based on (5), it can be
shown that ∑
Vi∈Vw
(pˆi − p¯σ(i)) · ri ≥ 0 (6)
Besides, it is easy to see that the assignment Aj for each
winning seller Cj ∈ Cw satisfies |Aj | ≤ kj .
Lemma 3. The TMC is truthful.
Proof. Here, we need to show the truthfulness for sellers and
buyers one by one as follows:
For each buyer Vs ∈ V, we need to show its utility
uˆs when giving a truthful bid Bs = V s is not less than
its corresponding utility uˆ′s when given an untruthful bid
B′s 6= V s. Afterward, any notation xs and x′s refer to the
concepts given by bid Bs and B′s respectively.
(a) The Vs is a winning buyer when bidding truthfully:
According to Algorithm 3, it wins the seller Ctm such that
maximizes its utility. Thereby, the utility uˆstm ≥ uˆst for each
Ct ∈ Is. First, for each seller Ct ∈ Is, it implies Vs ∈ Ht and
giving an untruthful bid (bts)
′ to seller Ct cannot increase the
utility such that uˆ′st > uˆst since
• (bts)
′ > vts: The charged price pˆ
′
st(= pˆst) will not be
changed because the Vs has been in Ht when biding bts(=
vts). Thus, we have uˆ
′
st = uˆst.
• (bts)
′ < vts: The charged price pˆ
′
st(= pˆst) will not be
changed if the Vs is still in Ht when bidding (bts)′(< vts).
Thus, we have uˆ′st = uˆst. However, when this untruthful
bid (bts)
′ decreases to be lower than pˆst, the Vs cannot
be in Ht and uˆ′st = 0. Thus, we have uˆ′st < uˆst.
Then, for each seller Ct ∈ V\Is, it can be divided into two
sub-cases where giving an untruthful bid (bts)
′ to seller Ct
cannot increase the utility such that uˆ′st > uˆst as well. They
are analyzed as follows:
• Vst /∈ Vc: If at ≥ ajφ , it is impossible to make Vst be in
Vc according to Algorithm 2 regardless of what the (bts)′
is. Thus, we have uˆ′st = uˆst = 0. If at < ajφ but truthful
bid bts(= v
t
s) < ajφ , the Vs has to increase its bid such
that (bts)
′ ≥ ajφ in order to make Vst be in Vc. At this
time, we have
uˆ′st = (v
t
s − pˆ′st) · rs ≤ (vts − ajφ) · rs < 0 (7)
if Ct ∈ Is when bidding (bts)′ untruthfully, otherwise
uˆ′st = 0. Thus, we have uˆ
′
st < uˆst = 0.
• Vst ∈ Vc but Vs /∈ Ht: In this case, we can know that the
Ht has been full where |Ht| = kt. From this, we have
bto · ro ≥ bts(= vts) · rs where Vo has minimum value of
bto · ro among all buyers in Ht. The Vs has to increase
its bid such that (bts)
′ ≥ bto · (ro/rs) in order to replace
Vo in Ht. Then, the charged price will be changed to
pˆ′st = b
t
o · (ro/rs). The utility is
uˆ′st = (v
t
s − pˆ′st) · rs =
(
vts −
btoro
rs
)
· rs < 0 (8)
since bto · ro ≥ vts · rs. Thus we have uˆ′st < uˆst = 0.
(b) The Vs is not a winning buyer when bidding truthfully:
According to Algorithm 3, there is no such a Ht for Ct ∈ Cc
that has Vs ∈ Ht. For each seller Ct ∈ C, we have utility
uˆst = 0. Similarly, we need to show giving an untruthful bid
(bts)
′ to seller Ct cannot increase the utility such that uˆ′st >
uˆst. The analysis about it can be divided into Vst /∈ Vc and
Vst ∈ Vc but Vs /∈ Ht, which are the same as the analysis for
Ct ∈ V\Is in part (a). Thus, we have uˆ′st ≤ uˆst = 0.
From above, the utility of Vs to each seller Ct ∈ C satisfies
uˆst ≥ uˆ′st definitely. By selecting the the seller such that
maximizes its utility, we have uˆs ≥ uˆ′s. Therefore, the buyers
are truthful.
For each seller Ct ∈ C, we need to show its utility u¯t when
giving a truthful ask at = ct is not less than its corresponding
utility u¯′t when given an untruthful ask a
′
t 6= ct. Afterward,
any notation xt and x′t refer to the concepts given by bid at
and a′t respectively.
(c) The Ct is a winning seller when asking truthfully: Accord-
ing to Algorithm 3, its ask at(= ct) < ajφ and at least one
buyer are assigned to it. Hence, we have |At| > 0. Its utility
can be denoted by
u¯t = (ajφ − ct) ·
∑
Vi∈At
ri > 0 (9)
since p¯t = ajφ . Consider to give an untruthful ask a
′
t, we can
discuss as follows:
• a′t ≥ ajφ : It loses this auction because the new median
ask a′jφ is not less than ajφ and a
′
t ≥ a′jφ ≥ ajφ . Thus,
the utility is u¯′t = 0 < u¯t.
• a′t < ajφ : At the time, the new median ask a
′
jφ
is equal
to ajφ and a
′
t < a
′
jφ
= ajφ . Moveover, the assignment
of Ct remains unchanged, A′t = At, and the rewarded
payment p¯′t = p¯t. According to (9), the utility when
asking untruthfully is the same as that when asking
truthfully. Thus, we have u¯′t = u¯t.
(d) The Ct is not a winning seller when asking truthfully: At
this time, its utility when asking truthfully is u¯t = 0. Here,
we need to analyze how the Ct loses this auction. If losing
since ct ≥ ajφ , we have
• a′t < ajφ : The new median ask a
′
jφ
is not more than ajφ
and a′t ≤ a′jφ ≤ ajφ . If the Ct still lose the auction, its
utility u¯′t = 0. If the Ct wins now, its utility u¯
′
t ≤ 0
because of the rewarded payment p¯′t = a
′
jφ
≤ ajφ ≤ ct.
Thus, we have u¯′t ≤ u¯t = 0.
• a′t ≥ ajφ : It loses this auction because the new median
ask a′jφ is equal to ajφ and a
′
t ≥ ajφ = a′jφ . Thus, the
utility is u¯′t = u¯t = 0.
If ct < ajφ but still lose, there are two situations that no any
buyer Vst gives a bid bts such that b
t
s ≥ ajφ or utility uˆst is
not the maximum one for each Vs ∈ Vw. Now,
• a′t < ajφ : The above two situations still happen because
the new median ask a′jφ = ajφ and a
′
t < a
′
jφ
. Thus, we
have u¯′t = u¯t = 0.
• a′t ≥ ajφ : It loses this auction because the new median
ask a′jφ is not less than ajφ and a
′
t ≥ a′jφ ≥ ajφ . Thus,
the utility is u¯′t = u¯t = 0.
Therefore, the sellers are truthful.
In summary, both buyers and sellers cannot improve the
utility by deviating from their valuations and costs.
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Algorithm 4 EMC (V,C,B,R,A,K)
Input: V,C,B,R,A,K
Output: Vw,Cw, σ, Pˆw, P¯w
1: (Vc,Cc, ajψ )← EMC-WCD (V,C,B,A)
2: (Vw,Cw, σ, Pˆw, P¯w)← EMC-AP (Vc,Cc, ajψ ,R,K)
3: return (Vw,Cw, σ, Pˆw, P¯w)
Lemma 4. The TMC is computationally efficient.
Proof. In Algorithm 2, there are nm buyers in V′, hence it
takes O(nm log(nm)) and O(m log(m)) times to sort the V′
and C′ respectively. The size of V′′ in line 7 is at most nφ,
and the number of iterations in the for-loop (line 8-15) is at
most nφ. Consequently, the time complexity of Algorithm 2
is O(nm log(nm)). In Algorithm 3, it takes O(nφ log(nφ))
times to sort the Vc. The number of iterations in the while-loop
(line 5-18) is at most n. The line 12 can be executed at most∑m
i=1 ki times, thus it takes O(n+
∑m
i=1 ki) time to execute
this while-loop. Besides, there are at most n buyers in Vw
and find the best (line 22) from at most φ sellers, thus it takes
O(nφ) time to execute the for-loop (line 20-28). Consequently,
the time complexity of Algorithm 2 is O(nφ log(nφ)) and
overall time complexity of TMC is O(nm log(nm)).
Theorem 1. The TMC is individually rational, budget bal-
anced, truthful, and computationally efficient.
Proof. It can be derived from Lemma 1 to Lemma 4.
VII. EFFICIENT MECHANISM FOR CHARGING
Even though TMC is able to ensure the truthfulness, it sac-
rifices the system efficiency. Shown as Algorithm 3, suppose
the winning buyer Vs satisfies Vs ∈ Ht1 and Vs ∈ Ht2 , it
can be assigned to only one seller t ∈ {t1, t2}. Thus, another
seller will have a charging pile empty, which could be used to
charge other buyers. Thus, for each winning buyer Vs ∈ Vw
with |Is| > 1, there are |Is| − 1 charging piles being wasted.
To address this drawback, we propose an efficient mechanism
for charging (EMC) to improve system efficiency and ensure
its truthfulness to some extent.
A. Algorithm Design
The process of EMC is shown in Algorithm 4. Similar
to TMC, it is composed of winning candidate determination
(EMC-WCD) and assignment & pricing (EMC-AP). Here, the
EMC-WCD is the same as TMC-WCD shown in Algorithm
2, which can be used to generate a winning buyer candidate
set Vc and winning seller candidate set Cc. The EMC-AP is
shown in Algorithm 5.
Shown as Algorithm 5, in the process of assignment &
pricing, we sort the winning buyer candidates in Vc in de-
scending order based on their total bids. Then, we give priority
to assigning the buyer that can give the maximum total bid,
which is the critical step to improve the system efficiency.
At each iteration, we pop the buyer that has the maximum
total bid from Qc, denoted by Vsltl and check whether the
seller Ctl requested by Vsl still have available charging piles.
Algorithm 5 EMC-AP (Vc,Cc, ajφ ,R,K)
Input: Vc,Cc, ajφ ,R,K
Output: Vw,Cw, σ, Pˆw, P¯w
1: Vw ← ∅,Cw ← ∅, Pˆw ← ∅, P¯w ← ∅
2: Sort the buyers in Vc, get an ordered queue Qc =
〈Vs1t1 , Vs2t2 , · · · , Vsyty 〉 such that bt1s1 · rs1 ≥ bt2s2 · rs2 ≥
· · · ≥ btysy · rsy
3: K ′ = (k′1, k
′
2, · · · , k′m) copied from vector K
4: while Qc 6= ∅ do
5: Vsltl ← Qc.pop(0)
6: if ktl > 0 then
7: σ(sl) = tl, k
′
tl
← k′tl − 1
8: Vw ← Vw ∪ {Vsl}, pˆsl ← ajφ , Pˆw ← Pˆw ∪ {pˆsl}
9: if Ctl /∈ Cw then
10: Cw ← Cw ∪ {Ctl}
11: end if
12: for each Vslt ∈ Qc do
13: Qc ← Qc\{Vslt}
14: end for
15: else
16: Atl ← {Vs ∈ Vw : σ(s) = tl}
17: for each Vs ∈ Atl do
18: pˆs ← max{ajφ , btlsl · (rsl/rs)} ∈ Pˆw
19: end for
20: for each Vstl ∈ Qc do
21: Qc ← Qc\{Vstl}
22: end for
23: end if
24: end while
25: for each Ct ∈ Cw do
26: p¯t ← ajφ , P¯w ← P¯w ∪ {p¯t} // Payments
27: end for
28: return (Vw,Cw, σ, Pˆw, P¯w)
If yes, k′tl > 0, the buyer Vsl will be assigned to seller
Ctl . Also, Vsl is a winning buyer, Ctl is a winning seller,
and the price charged to buyer Vsl is given by pˆsl = ajφ
tentatively. Furthermore, the requests from buyer Vsl to other
sellers should be deleted from Qc since the buyer Vsl has been
assigned. If no, k′tl = 0, the buyer Vsl will not be assigned
to seller Ctl because there is no unoccupied charging piles in
Ctl . It implies that in previous iterations, the buyers in Atl
have been assigned to seller Ctl , then the price charged to
each winning buyer Vs ∈ Atl has to be changed to its critical
price pˆs = btlsl · (rsl/rs). Finally, the payment rewarded to
winning seller is given by ajφ unanimously.
B. Properties of EMC
Similar to Sec. VI-B, we analyze whether our EMC mech-
anism satisfies the aforementioned four properties.
Lemma 5. The EMC is individually rational.
Proof. It can be discussed similar to proof of Lemma 1.
Lemma 6. The EMC is budget balanced.
Proof. It can be discussed similar to proof of Lemma 2.
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Lemma 7. The EMC is not truthful, but the truthfulness is
held for sellers.
Proof. For a buyer Vs /∈ Vw when biding truthfully, giving
an untruthful bid (bts)
′ to seller Ct cannot increase the utility
such that uˆ′st < uˆst = 0, which can be divided into Vst /∈ Vc
(similar to the analysis for Vst /∈ Vc in part (a) of Lemma 3)
and Vst ∈ Vc. Consider the case Vst ∈ Vc, it exists a Vot ∈ Qc
with bto·ro ≥ bts(= vts)·rs which is the last one can be assigned
to seller Ct in Algorithm 5. To replace Vot, the Vs has to bid a
(bts)
′ such that (bts)
′ ≥ bto·(ro/rs) and the charged price will be
pˆ′st = b
t
o ·(ro/rs). From here, we have uˆ′st ≤ 0 since pˆ′st ≥ vts.
For a buyer Vs ∈ Vw, we give two examples where giving an
untruthful bid is possible to improve its utility. There are two
sellers o1 and o2 requested by the Vs lie in Qc when it bids
truthfully, thus Qc = 〈· · · , Vso1 , · · · , Vslo1 , · · · , Vso2 , · · · 〉
with vo1s · rs ≥ bo1sl · rsl ≥ vo2s · rs. The results returned by
Algorithm 5 are σ(s) = o1, pˆs = bo1sl · (rsl/rs), and k′o2 > 0.
At this time, its utility is uˆs = (vo1s − bo1sl · (rsl/rs)) · rs.
When giving an untruthful bid (bo1s )
′ such that (bo1s )
′ < vo2s ,
the results are changed to σ′(s) = o2, pˆ′s = ajφ . At this time,
its utility is uˆ′s = (v
o2
s −ajφ) · rs. We cannot judge which one
is larger since vo1s ≥ vo2s and bo1sl · (rsl/rs) ≥ ajφ . If uˆ′s > uˆs,
its utility can be improved by biding untruthfully. Similarly, it
can give an untruthful bid (bo2s )
′ such that (bo2s )
′ > vo1s , the
results are changed to σ′(s) = o2, pˆ′s = ajφ as well. Thus,
truthfulness is not held for winning buyers.
The analysis for sellers are similar to the case (c) and (d)
in proof of Lemma 3, thus truthfulness is held for sellers.
Lemma 8. The EMC is computationally efficient.
Proof. It can be discussed similar to proof of Lemma 4.
Theorem 2. The EMC is individually rational, budget bal-
anced, computationally efficient, but not truthful.
Proof. It can be derived from Lemma 5 to Lemma 8.
In EMC, we attempt to assign each buyer in Vc to a seller
in a greedy manner, thus avoiding the waste of charging piles.
Thereby, it increases the number of winning buyers (successful
trades) and improves system efficiency. Even though the
winning buyers are able to improve their utilities by biding
untruthfully, this is difficult to achieve. In our BCS system,
each player bids or asks privately. The buyer cannot have the
knowledge of other players’ strategies such as other buyers’
bids and sellers’ asks. Thus, it is not able to predict whether
it will win, which seller it will be assigned to, and its charged
price. For the buyer losing the auction, it is possible to get
a negative utility when biding untruthfully. For the buyer
winning the auction, despite the potential of improving its
utility, there is also the possibility of losing the auction when
biding untruthfully. Obviously, they have no motivation to lie
because the risks are great. Therefore, we can say the EMC
is truthful to some extent.
C. A Walk-through Example
To understand our TMC and EMC algorithms clearly and
compare their difference, we give a walk-through example
TABLE I
AN EXAMPLE WITH 5 BUYERS AND 5 SELLERS.
B C1 C2 C3 C4 C5 R
V1 0 4 0 5 2 5
V2 2 0 5 1 0 2
V3 7 5 0 4 0 6
V4 6 4 0 3 0 4
V5 0 0 2 3 5 3
A 4 1 3 2 5 -
K 1 2 4 2 3 -
with 5 buyers and 5 sellers. The bids and charging amounts
of buyers, the asks and number of charging piles of sellers are
shown in Table I.
In TMC-WCD (EMC-WCD) according to Algorithm 2,
the median of asks is denoted by ajφ = a3 = 3. We can
get V′ = 〈V31, V41, V14, V23, V32, V55, V12, V34, V42, V44, V54〉.
By removing those Vst ∈ V′ with at ≥ ajφ , we have
Vc = {V14, V32, V12, V34, V42, V44, V54} and Cc = {C2, C4}.
Then, sort the Vc according to their total bids, we have
Qc = 〈V32 = 30, V14 = 25, V34 = 24, V12 = 20, V42 =
16, V44 = 12, V54 = 9〉.
For TMC, in TMC-AP according to Algorithm 3, we have
tentative sets H2 = {V1, V3} with pˆ12 = max{ajφ , b24 ·
(r4/r1)} = 3.2, pˆ32 = max{ajφ , b24 · (r4/r3)} = 3 and
H4 = {V1, V3} with pˆ14 = max{ajφ , b44 · (r4/r1)} = 3, pˆ34 =
max{ajφ , b44 · (r4/r3)} = 3. For the buyer V1, its utility
satisfies uˆ12 = (b21 − pˆ12) · r1 = 4 < 10 = uˆ14. For
the buyer V3, its utility satisfies uˆ32 > uˆ34. Thus, we have
Vw = {V1, V3}, Cw = {C2, C4}, {σ(1) = 4, σ(3) = 2},
Pˆw = {pˆ1 = 3, pˆ3 = 3}, and P¯w = {p¯2 = 3, p¯4 = 3}.
For EMC, in EMC-AP according to Algorithm 5, we assign
buyer V3 to seller C2 with pˆ3 = 3 in the first iteration,
then Qc is revised to Qc = 〈V14 = 25, V12 = 20, V42 =
16, V44 = 12, V54 = 9〉. Repeat it until Qc = ∅, we have
Vw = {V1, V3, V4, V5}, Cw = {C2, C4}, {σ(1) = 4, σ(3) =
2, σ(4) = 2, σ(5) = 4}, Pˆw = {pˆ1 = 3, pˆ3 = 3, pˆ4 = 3, pˆ5 =
3}, and P¯w = {p¯2 = 3, p¯4 = 3}. From this example, we can
see that the winning sellers in TMC are not full where there
are idle charging piles not used to charge vehicles. Therefore,
the number of successful trades |Vw| = 2 in TMC is less than
|Vw| = 4 in EMC, which explains the reason why the system
efficiency of EMC is better than TMC.
VIII. NUMERICAL SIMULATIONS
In this section, we implement our TMC and EMC algo-
rithms and evaluate their performances separately.
A. Simulation Setup
To simulate our TMC and EMC, we consider a smart area
B = (M,V,C) with 1000 × 1000 m2. There are m CSs and
n EVs distributed uniformly in this area, where we default by
n = 10·m unless otherwise specified. For each CS Cj ∈ C, its
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(a) TMC
(b) EMC
Fig. 4. The assignment results and individual rationality obtained by our
TMC and EMC.
number of charging piles kj is generated from {1, 2, · · · , 10}
with probability 1/10. The cost cj of CS Cj is generated
according a uniform distribution within (0, 1]. Similarly, for
each EV Vi ∈ V, its charging amount ri is sampled from a
truncated normal distribution with mean 50 and variance 1 in
interval (0, 100]. To quanfify its valuation vji to CS Cj , we
defined the distance dji between Vi and Cj as
dji =
√
(xi − xj)2 + (yi − yj)2 (10)
where (xi, yi) and (xj , yj) are the coordinates of Vi and Cj .
In general, the larger dji is, the lower v
j
i is. The maximum
distance between two entities in this area is 1000
√
2, thus we
assume that vji = 1− dji/(1000
√
2).
B. Simulation Results and Analysis
To evaluate the individual rationality, budget balance, and
truthfulness, we consider a smart area with m = 10
CSs and n = 100 EVs. They can be denoted by C =
{C1, C2, · · · , C10} and V = {V1, V2, · · · , V100}. The median
ask is ajφ = 0.764 and there are five winning sellers, thus
Cw = {C1, C2, C6, C7, C10}. Moveover, the corresponding
number of charging piles of CSs in Cw is given by {r1 :
3, r2 : 8, r6 : 4, r7 : 3, r10 : 8}.
(a) Buyer V50 ∈ Vw (b) Seller C1 ∈ Cw
(c) Buyer V86 /∈ Vw (d) Seller C3 /∈ Cw
Fig. 5. The truthfulness of buyers and sellers in TMC.
(a) Buyer V50 ∈ Vw (b) Seller C1 ∈ Cw
(c) Buyer V86 /∈ Vw (d) Seller C3 /∈ Cw
Fig. 6. The truthfulness of buyers and sellers in EMC.
Individual Rationality: Fig. 4 shows the assignment results
and individual rationality obtained by TMC and EMC. The
first line from the bottom is sellers (CSs) and the second line
from the bottom is buyers (EVs). Take Fig. 4(a) as an example,
for the seller C1, there are two buyers, V50 and V58, assigned to
it in TMC. For the mapping σ(50) = 1, the payment rewarded
to C1 (red column) is more than the ask of C1 (grey column)
and the price charged to V50 (green column) is less than the
bid of V50 (blue column). Then, for all mappings from Vw to
Cw in TMC and EMC, the price charged to winning buyer is
not more than its bid and the payment rewarded to winning
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Fig. 7. The running time varies with the increasing number of CSs in TMC
and EMC.
Fig. 8. The number of successful trades (winning buyers) varies with the
increasing number of CSs in TMC and EMC.
seller is not less than its ask, thus individual rationality is held.
Budget Balance: According to the charged price and
rewarded payment shown as Fig. 4, the total price charged to
all winning buyers is not less than the total payment rewarded
to all winning seller. Furthermore, the number of buyers |Aj |
assigned to each seller Cj ∈ Cw is not more than its number
of charging piles kj , namely we have |Aj | ≤ kj . Thereby the
budget balance is held in both TMC and EMC.
Truthfulness: We select a winning buyer V50 ∈ Vw, a
losing buyer V86 /∈ Vw, a winning seller C1 ∈ Cw, and a
losing seller C3 /∈ Cw as the representatives to evaluate the
truthfulness of buyers and sellers in our TMC and EMC. Fig.
5 and Fig. 6 shows the truthfulness of buyers and sellers in
TMC and EMC. Let us look at Fig. 5 in TMC firstly. For the
winning buyer V50, σ(50) = 1, it can get the maximum utility
uˆ50 = 9.932 when giving the truthful bid b150 = v
1
50 = 0.905.
Here, we have I50 = {C1, C10} and its utility cannot be
improved when changing the bids to the seller in I50. If
the bid b150 < 0.77, its utility will decrease to 1.819 since
the V50 will not be selected in H1 and then be assigned
to seller C10. Besides, by changing the bids to sellers that
are not in Vc (C8) or in Vc but not in I50 (C6), its utility
cannot be improved as well. For the winning seller C1, it
can get the maximum utility u¯1 when giving the truthful ask
a1 = c1 = 0.434, which cannot be improved by changing its
ask. For the losing buyer V86, the utility uˆ86 is impossible to
be more than zero when biding untruthfully. Its utility will be
negative if increasing the bids to sellers in Vc (C3 and C6).
For the losing seller C3, it achieves zero utility when giving
the truthful ask a3 = c3 = 0.896, which will be negative if
decreasing its ask. Next, let us look at Fig. 6 in EMC. We have
the same observations in sub-figure shown as (b), (c), and (d).
For the winning buyer V50, σ(50) = 1, it has a little different
from that in TMC. If increasing the bids to other sellers in Vc
(C6 and C10), its utility will decrease, even be negative, since
the V50 will be assigned to C6 or C10 instead of C1 since total
bids have been varied. Notably, the untruthful phenomenon for
winning buyers does not appear. In fact, it does not happen
very often. Thereby, the truthfulness is held in TMC and held
in EMC to some extent.
To evaluate the computational efficiency and system effi-
ciency, we consider a smart area whose number of CSs m
ranges from 0 to 200. The parameters are sampled according
to the rules described in the simulation setup.
Computational Efficiency: Fig. 7 shows the running time
comparison between TMC and EMC. We default by n =
10 ·m, thereby the time complexity O(nm log(nm)) can be
considered as 10 ·m2 approximately. The trends shown as Fig.
7 is in line with our expectations and they are computationally
efficient. Besides, we can observe that the running time of
EMC is slightly lower than that of TMC since there are more
entities eliminated in advance.
System Efficiency: Here, the system efficiency can be char-
acterized by the number of successful trades between buyers
and sellers, which is equal to the number of winning buyers
in Vw because each winning buyers will be assigned to a
winning seller and then begin to trade. Fig. 8 shows the system
efficiency comparison between TMC and EMC. The system
efficiency is not monotone since we sample the parameters
used in this simulation at each number of sellers independently.
Shown as Fig. 8, we can observe that the system efficiency
in EMC is apparently better than that in TMC, which implies
our proposed EMC is an effective approach to improve system
efficiency even though it does not guarantee the truthfulness of
buyers in the extreme case. Next, the gap between TMC and
EMC increases gradually as the number of sellers increases.
This is because the buyer who bid higher can take over more
tentative sets of candidate sellers in Algorithm 3. However,
it can be assigned to only one in these tentative sets, which
causes a lot of waste and enlarge the gap.
IX. CONCLUSION
In this paper, a charging scheduling system based on
blockchain technology and constrained double auction has
been designed and implemented. To achieve privacy protec-
tion and scalability, we gave a lightweight charging schedul-
ing framework based on asymmetric encryption and DAG-
blockchain. To incentivize EVs and CSs to participate in the
market, we considered a constrained double auction model
and designed two algorithms, TMC and EMC, that attempt
to assign EVs (buyers) in this area to be charged in CSs
(sellers). Both algorithms are feasible, which ensures individ-
ual rationality, budget balance, truthfulness, and computational
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efficiency. Here, EMC can get a better system efficiency than
TMC, but it weakens the truthfulness of buyers to some extent.
Finally, the results of numerical simulations indicated that our
model is robust and theoretical analysis is correct.
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